We find evidence that retirees in 2000, in particular, are on course to potentially experience the worst retirement outcomes of any retiree since 1926. This holds for a wide variety of asset allocations and withdrawal rate strategies. Wealth depletion is taking place more rapidly for 2000-era retirees than for retirees who even endured the Great Depression or the stagflation of the 1970s. Though moderate inflation during the past decade has resulted in current withdrawal rates that are a bit less for the 2000 retiree than for some retirees in the 1960s, this is hardly reassuring with further analysis based on the required future asset returns needed for sustainability. Our findings cast doubt as to whether the 4 percent withdrawal rate rule will be sustainable for turn-of-the-century retirees.
created a standard methodology for finding a safe withdrawal rate using historical data. His "SAFEMAX" is the minimum of all the maximum sustainable withdrawal rates (MWR) for rolling periods of a chosen length (often 30 years) during the overall historical period under consideration. Using data on the U.S. S&P 500 and intermediate-term U.S. government bonds since 1926, he suggested that an initial withdrawal rate (WR 0 ) of 4 percent of accumulated savings at retirement, an amount which can then be adjusted for inflation in subsequent years, will safely provide income for at least 30 years when the stock allocation is between 50 and 75 percent. The 4 percent WR 0 strategy was safe for 30-year retirement periods beginning between 1926 and 1980 in the United States, at least for the stylized assumptions used in withdrawal rate studies (such as no portfolio management or administrative fees, withdrawals that are taken at the end of each year, complete commitment to the asset allocation and rebalancing aspects of the strategy, and no need to ever extend withdrawals beyond 30 years). But it is important to realize that withdrawal rate studies cannot incorporate the Are more recent retirees on course to potentially experiencing the worst retirement outcomes of anyone in the post-1926 period? Will the 4 percent withdrawal rate rule still be safe? After all, there is nothing special about 4 percent that protects retirees from potential mishap. As the length of the historical period increases, the nature of Bengen's SAFEMAX calculations means that the only direction the SAFEMAX can possibly go is down. Pfau [2010] argues that U.S. data since 1926 provided very favorable results for retirees. When looking at 17 developed market countries since 1900, Pfau finds that even with overly optimistic assumptions, the SAFEMAX would have been above 4 percent only in 4 of the 17 countries. SAFEMAXs were even under 3 percent in Spain, Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, and Japan. The implication is that historical asset returns since 1926 in the United States were indeed quite high and do not provide a suitable foundation for forward looking forecasts of asset returns or retirement withdrawal strategies. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton [2004] developed this general point earlier, arguing that it is "irrational optimism" to assume that the stock market will always provide a positive real return over a 20-year period. The U.S. was one of only four countries out of 16 to enjoy these persistently positive returns.
We find that based on the conditions experienced in the first 10 years of retirement, 1999 and 2000 retirees are on course to potentially experience outcomes as bad as any American retirees since 1926. To determine this, we first develop a link between what happens early in retirement and the final outcome after 30 years. The strength of the link depends on factors including asset allocation, initial withdrawal rates, and administrative fees. We find in our baseline case that the amount of wealth remaining 10 years into retirement combined with the cumulative inflation since retirement can explain up to 80 percent of the variation in final retirement outcome measures after 30 years. With this link established, we investigate the amount of wealth remaining 10 years after retirement for rolling periods from the historical data since 1926. We generally find that retirees in 1999 rank among the bottom few positions in terms of remaining wealth, and in many situations the 2000 retirees are in the worst shape of anyone.
We further investigate the evolution of remaining wealth and other characteristics for the poor retirement periods beginning in 1929, 1966, and 2000, and attempt to provide perspective on what may be the ultimate outcomes for more recent retirees. This detailed year analysis clarifies that the current withdrawal rate (CWR) after 10 years is actually more important to determine ultimate retirement success than just the amount of remaining wealth. With this criterion, the 1999 and 2000 retirees fare only slightly better.
The CWR in any post-retirement year is the proportion of remaining wealth that is withdrawn in that year. Because withdrawal amounts are adjusted for inflation but are not impacted by asset returns, the CWR differs from the initial withdrawal rate when asset returns do not precisely offset the inflation-adjusted withdrawals and account fees. The CWR increases with higher inflation, a higher WR 0 value, and lower remaining wealth.
Not considering fees, which complicate the formula due to being taken out at the end of the year after asset returns are known, the pre-fee CWR in any given year is the initial withdrawal amount adjusted for cumulative inflation since retirement, divided by the amount of wealth remaining at the start of the year.
The most destructive scenario for a new retiree is facing high inflation and negative portfolio returns in the years immediately following retirement. Retirees adjusting their withdrawals for inflation liquidate increasing amounts of wealth at the same time that capital losses are decimating the remaining portfolio balance. An increasing CWR creates a compounding hurdle to recovery, as wealth will continue to be depleted and the CWR will continue to grow whenever real asset returns cannot keep pace. CWR increases accelerate and eventually exceed a terminal level from which recovery is all but impossible without a significant reduction in withdrawals.
The CWR explains variation in retirement outcomes not accounted for by the wealth remaining after 10 years, such as why the 1929 retiree was able to recover somewhat while the 1966 retire went on to experience the worst overall retirement outcome. The CWR indicates further bad news for turn-of-the-century retirees, as even the "safe" 4 percent withdrawal rate may fail them. After 10 years, the 2000 retiree has depleted wealth faster than anyone in history, but because inflation was much higher in the 1960s and 1970s, the CWR for some of those retirees is higher than for the 2000 retiree. But when we consider the real returns required for a 2000 retiree to sustain their retirement withdrawal strategy for a full 30 years based on what has happened through the start of 2010, and compare these required returns to reasonable forecasts for future asset returns based on current market fundamentals, the results are not promising.
Data and Methods for Calculating Retirement Outcome Measures
Though Pfau [2010] cautions against it, as the period covered was quite favorable for asset returns and may not be representative of what will happen in the future, this study uses the popular data choice for retirement withdrawal rate studies: Ibbotson Associates' Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) monthly data on total returns for U.S. financial markets since 1926. The objective is not to determine the SAFEMAX for past data, but to compare the situation of recent retirees to past retirees at equivalent points in their retirement. Following Bengen [1994] , this study uses the U.S. S&P 500 index (large-capitalization stocks) to represent the stock market and intermediate-term For each retirement year, we calculate the path of remaining wealth for as long as data is available up to a 30-year horizon. Upon retirement, accumulated portfolio wealth is assumed to be 100. At the beginning of the first year of retirement, an initial withdrawal is made equal to the initial withdrawal rate (WR 0 ) times accumulated wealth.
Remaining assets then grow or shrink according to the asset returns for the year. At the end of the year, portfolio administrative fees are deducted from the remaining account balance, and the remaining portfolio wealth is rebalanced to the targeted asset allocation.
In subsequent years, the withdrawal amount adjusts by the previous year's inflation rate and the order of portfolio transactions is repeated (make withdrawal, experience asset returns, deduct fees, rebalance). If the withdrawal pushes the account balance to zero, the withdrawal rate was too high and the portfolio failed. No attempt is made to consider taxes, which makes these findings applicable to Roth IRAs when considered on an aftertax basis. The assumptions to take withdrawals at the start of each year (rather than the end) and to include portfolio fees both serve to reduce the SAFEMAX. This paper considers cases of no portfolio fees and of a 1 percent fee charged by the fund manager or financial planner at the end of each year. The fee percentage, which is somewhat arbitrary, is meant to show the impact of fees on retirement sustainability.
The 1 percent fee is more than index funds tend to charge, but it is less than the average 1.6 percent fee for stock mutual funds and 1.2 percent fee for bond mutual funds found by Morningstar in 2008 (see http://news.morningstar.com/PDFs/Appendix_0409.pdf).
Overview of Past Retirement Outcomes
Exhibit 1 summarizes the retirement outcomes for past retirees. For a 30-year retirement duration, this exhibit shows the MWR with and without fees for a portfolio with a fixed asset allocation of 60 percent stocks and 40 percents bonds. The 4 percent safe withdrawal rate rule is attributable to 1966, when the maximum sustainable withdrawal rate was its lowest at just over 4 percent without fees. More generally, the no- 
The Strength of the Link Between Early and Late Retirement
The importance of the early retirement period to the ultimate outcome is known among academics and financial planners. The phenomenon is generally referred to as "sequence of returns risk." Bob's Financial Website [2008] also refers to it as "reverse dollar cost averaging." The basic idea, explained in more detail in Fullmer [2008] , is that poor asset returns at the beginning of retirement can lead to early wealth depletion that becomes difficult to overcome. This is fundamentally due to the nature of the retirement decumulation process and the compounding effects of withdrawals and poor asset returns.
In order to formalize this link between the early retirement period and the retirement outcomes after 30 years, we develop two simple regression models in which the remaining wealth and cumulative inflation at a given number of years after retirement, ranging from 0 to 30 years, is used to explain two different retirement outcome measures But when combined with less cumulative inflation, the 2000 retiree did experience lower CWRs. Nonetheless, CWRs for the 6 and 7 percent WR 0 values have already entered into their terminal phase and all remaining wealth will be wiped out within a few more years.
The CWRs for the lower initial withdrawals are also dangerously high.
What is in Store for the 2000 Retiree?
Exhibit 9 provides a final look at the 2000 retiree, plotting the pre-fee CWR at the start of 2010 for a 60/40 asset allocation and for various WR 0 and fee combinations, against the average real return required from the retiree's portfolio investments to sustain the same withdrawal strategy for another 20 years. These required returns provide an oversimplified starting point, as they assume no volatility in asset returns and thus ignore sequence of returns risk. If returns over the next few years fall below the requirements shown in the exhibit, then even higher returns will be needed in the future, and vice versa. 
Conclusions
No absolute conclusions can be made about the prospects for turn-of-the-century retirees, as that would require a crystal ball. Perhaps we are on the brink of a long-term sustained market boom that raises the fortunes of recent retirees. But the evidence shown here at least provides a strong indication that a 4 percent withdrawal rate strategy cannot be considered as safe for the 2000 retiree, even in the miraculous case that there are no portfolio management fees. With the fastest rate of wealth depletion and CWRs among the highest, the 2000 retiree could be on course to experience the worst retirement in U.S.
history since 1926, and may end up being the source for a new lower SAFEMAX value.
Turn-of-the-century retirees should definitely now consider their reliance on withdrawals from their retirement savings and their current withdrawal rate. They may find it necessary to make reductions to their expenses or to potentially seek other sources of income. 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Note: Assumptions, data definitions, and data sources are fully explained in the section, "Data and Methods for Calculating Retirement Outcome Measures." Plotted text shows the initial real withdrawal rate plus annual portfolio fee percentage, followed by the CWR after 10 years and the fixed real portfolio return required to sustain 20 more years of inflation-adjusted withdrawals starting from the CWR.
EXHIBIT 1 Maximum Sustainable Withdrawal Rates (MWR) for a 30-Year Duration 60% Stocks / 40% Bonds Asset Allocation

